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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS IN WASHINGTON
Legislative responses to the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the
last twenty years have taken many forms. I One form has been passage of
statutes of limitations to govern medical malpractice cases, aimed at re-
ducing the volume of litigation and, consequently, the cost of insurance.
The Washington Legislature enacted such legislation in 1971,2 and
amended it in 1976. 3
Generally, statutes of limitations run from the date of the alleged
wrongful act.4 Because the average person lacks a good understanding of
medical science and may not be aware of a wrongful medical practice
when it occurs, medical malpractice plaintiffs have a more difficult time
filing their causes of action within the allotted period than do other plain-
tiffs. As a result, many courts have devised methods of extending the
statutory period. Two common-law techniques have predominated in
Washington: (1) the discovery rule, and (2) the continuing course of treat-
ment rule.
This comment examines the Washington courts' use of these judicial
techniques to avoid strict application of the statute of limitations in medi-
cal malpractice cases. Part I summarizes the development and application
of the discovery rule and the continuing course of treatment rule before
1971. Part II analyzes the impact of Washington's current medical mal-
practice statute of limitations on these rules, with emphasis on the recent
cases of Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital5 and Bixler v. Bowman.6 This
comment concludes that the statutory discovery rule, as amended in
1976, sharply restricts the judicially-created discovery rule, resulting in a
clear pro-defendant bias. It concludes further that, despite language in
Bixler to the contrary, the continuing course of treatment rule survives,
albeit in a limited form.
1. See Roth, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Its Causes, the Effects, and Proposed
Solutions, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 469, 491-93 (1977) (review of the various legislative enactments in
this area); see also Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Con-
stitutionallmplications, 55 TEx. L. REV. 759, 763-69 (1977) (same).
2. Act of Mar. 23, 1971, ch. 80, 1971 Wash. Laws 194 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE §
4.16.350 (1981)), reprinted in part in note 36 infra.
3. Act of Feb. 21, 1976, ch. 56, 1975-76 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 214 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.16.350 (1981)), reprinted in part in note 37 infra.
4. See, e.g., Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn. 2d 660, 665,453 P.2d 631,634 (1969).
5. 92 Wn. 2d 507,598 P.2d 1358 (1979).
6. 94 Wn. 2d 146, 614 P.2d 1290 (1980).
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1. JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES BEFORE 1971
Statutes of limitations serve two major objectives. The first and most
important objective is to protect defendants from the unfair threat of lia-
bility arising from mostly forgotten incidents. The second objective is to
rid the courts of stale, and possibly fraudulent, claims. 7 The legislature
has determined that these objectives adequately justify barring otherwise
valid claims.
Special problems arise when statutes of limitations are applied in medi-
cal malpractice cases. Because medical science is so complex, a patient
often will be unable to recognize negligent treatment. Injuries resulting
from such medical care may not be detected until years after the doctor-
patient relationship has ended. 8 In addition, the unique, trusting relation-
ship between doctor and patient discourages vigilant scrutiny by the pa-
tient of the care he receives. 9
Because of these special problems, courts have created various tech-
niques to extend the statutes of limitations in medical malpractice cases. t0
Two of these techniques, the discovery rule and the continuing course of
treatment rule, have been used by the Washington courts.
A. The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule suspends the beginning of the statutory period until
the plaintiff either discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, should have discovered that the injury was caused by a doctor's
act or omission.lI The primary reason for the rule is that it is unfair to
require a plaintiff to bring a malpractice action when the plaintiff does not
and perhaps cannot know that the injury was caused by a negligent physi-
7. See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945): Ruth v. Dight. 75 Wn.
2d 660. 664-65,453 P.2d 631. 634 (1969).
8. 'Nature has a mysterious way at times of hiding mishaps in surgery, and cases are legion
where foreign objects such as sponges. scalpels, forceps and hemostats have been inadvertently left
in a surgical wound and the patient remained oblivious of it for years afterward." Ruth v. Dight. 75
Wn. 2d 660. 661.453 P.2d 631, 632 (1969).
9. See Janisch v. Mullins, I Wn. App. 393, 400-01. 461 P.2d 895. 899 (1969), review dis-
nissed by stipulation, 78 Wn. 2d 997 (1970).
10. The two most prominent techniques are discussed in this comment. A third, the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment, has also been employed by some courts. See note 58 infra.
11. See Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn. 2d 660, 667-68, 453 P.2d 631,636 (1969); Yerkes v. Rockwood
Clinic, I I Wn. App. 936, 941, 527 P.2d 689, 692 (1974): Janisch v. Mullins, I Wn. App. 393, 397.
461 P.2d 895, 897 (1969). This rule, with certain modifications, essentially has been codified in
Washington. See notes 36-44 and accompanying text infra.
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cian, or does not even know that the plaintiff has incurred any injury at
all. 12
Prior to 1971 there was no specific Washington statute limiting medical
malpractice actions. Such claims were governed by the three-year stat-
ute 13 applicable to all tort actions. Before they adopted the discovery rule
in 1969,14 the Washington courts employed the "unavoidable hardship
approach."1 5 Under this approach, the statutory period began when the
wrongful act caused the injury. Any hardship imposed on the plaintiff
whose injury was not discovered within three years was considered "un-
avoidable."
The leading case illustrating this approach is Lindquist v. Mullen. 16 In
Lindquist, plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently left a surgical
sponge inside her body during a 1946 hernia operation. Plaintiff com-
menced her action seven years later when the sponge was discovered. The
Washington Supreme Court held that the claim was barred by the three-
year statute of limitations because the claim accrued on the date of the
injury-causing wrongful act. 17 The court declined to adopt plaintiff's
contention that her cause of action accrued upon her discovery of the neg-
ligence rather than at the time the injury occurred. 18
In Ruth v. Dight19 the Washington court adopted the discovery rule it
had rejected in Lindquist. In Ruth, the question was when the statute of
limitations began to run when a plaintiff did not, and with reasonable
effort could not, discover the presence of a foreign substance left in her
body by defendant doctor. Plaintiff in Ruth had a hysterectomy performed
by the defendant in 1944. Exploratory surgery twenty-two years later re-
vealed a sponge left from the earlier operation. Overruling Lindquist, the
court announced that, in medical malpractice cases based upon the negli-
gent failure to remove foreign substances from the body, the statutory
period begins when plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discov-
ered, the presence of the foreign substance. 20
The Washington Court of Appeals extended the discovery rule to
12. See, e.g., Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wn. 2d 675, 682-83, 277 P.2d 724, 728 (1954) (Finley,
J., dissenting).
13. WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.16.080 (1981).
14. See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
15. Janisch v. Mullins, 1 Wn. App. 393, 396, 461 P.2d 895, 896-97 (1969), review dismissed
by stipulation, 78 Wn. 2d 997 (1970).
16. 45 Wn. 2d 675,277 P.2d 724(1954).
17. Id. at 676,277 P.2d at 724.
18. Id. at 678, 277 P.2d at 725. See generally 30 WASH. L. REv. 181 (1955) (discussion of
Lindquist).
19. 75 Wn. 2d 660,453 P.2d"631 (1969).
20. Id. at 667-68,453 P.2d at 636.
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claims of negligent diagnosis in Janisch v. Mu//ins. 21 In Janisch, defen-
dant had examined plaintiff's eyes in 1958. The complaint, filed nine
years after the examination, alleged that defendant's negligent reading of
an X-ray resulted in plaintiff's blindness. The court, extending the Ruth
discovery rule, held that the claim was not barred.22 The court gave three
reasons for its holding. First, it felt that the trusting relationship between
doctor and patient should be fostered; the patient should not be compelled
constantly to scrutinize a doctor to preserve a possible cause of action. 23
Second, the court noted that the added likelihood of legal action would
encourage greater care by physicians in surgery and treatment gener-
ally. 24 Last, the court said that nothing in the rationale underlying the
discovery rule supported a distinction between different kinds of malprac-
tice. 25
B. The Continuing Course of Treatment Rule
The continuing course of treatment rule starts the statute of limitations
running either when the physician-patient relationship ends, or when the
patient actually discovers the negligence, whichever occurs first. 26 The
continuing treatment generally must be for the same condition that led to
the injury. 27 Although some jurisdictions, including Washington, 28 re-
quire that the physician's negligence continue throughout the relation-
ship, many require only continuing treatment after the initial negli-
gence. 29
The reason for the continuing course of treatment rule is grounded in
the nature of the doctor-patient relationship and in the complexity of med-
ical science generally. The patient must rely upon the physician's skill
and knowledge in determining how best to treat an injury or illness. The
patient lacks adequate expertise reasonably to challenge the doctor's
judgment. Thus, a patient ordinarily will be unaware of the physician's
21. I Wn. App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1969), review disnissed by stipulation. 78 Wn. 2d 997
(1970).
22 Id. at 401-02,461 P.2d at 899-900.
23. Id. at400-01,461 P.2d at 899.
24. Id. at 401,461 P.2d at 899.
25. Id. Other Washington cases applying the common-law discovery rule include Fraser v.
Weeks. 76 Wn. 2d 819, 456 P.2d 351 (1969), Denison v. Goforth. 75 Wn. 2d 853. 454 P.2d 218
(1969); Yerkes v. Rockwood Clinic. II Wn. App. 936, 527 P.2d 689 (1974).
26. See. e.g.. Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 131. 135 (1958):
Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368. 379-83 (1961).
27. Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wn. 2d 894, 900,454 P.2d 406. 410 (1969).
28. See Koenig v. Group Health Coop., 5 Wn. App. 836. 838.491 P.2d 702, 703 (1971).
29. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368. 379 (1961) (review of rule in various jurisdictions).
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negligent conduct while continuing to rely on the physician's advice. 30
Under these circumstances, tolling the statute of limitations until the end
of the doctor-patient relationship is reasonable.
The continuing course of treatment rule was adopted by Washington
courts in 1969.31 Before then, the case of McCoy v. Stevens32 controlled.
Plaintiff in McCoy alleged injury from defendant's negligent operation of
an X-ray machine in 1928. Defendant treated plaintiff for four years after
that. Plaintiff brought her action in 1934, six years after the initial treat-
ment but only two years after she stopped consulting defendant. Plaintiff
argued that her cause of action did not accrue until defendant's services
ended. The court rejected that contention, holding that the statutory pe-
riod commenced at the time of the original X-ray treatments.33
In Samuelson v. Freeman,34 the court overruled McCoy insofar as
McCoy had rejected the continuing course of treatment rule. In Samuel-
son, the issue was whether the statutory period began with the first negli-
gent act or did not begin until the end of a period of negligent treatment
following the initial negligence. Defendant operated on plaintiff's broken
leg in 1960. Plaintiff filed her complaint in 1964, initially alleging negli-
gence by the defendant during the immediately preceding three years. She
later attempted to amend her complaint to include negligence in perform-
ing the surgery. The trial judge denied the motion to amend because the
claim was not brought within three years of the alleged wrongful act. De-
claring the continuing course of treatment rule a "sensible corollary" to
the discovery rule, the supreme court reversed. The court held that the
statute of limitations is tolled until continuing negligent treatment is ter-
minated, 35 thereby adding the second avoidance technique to the judicial
repertoire.
II. IMPACT OF THE WASHINGTON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE
JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES
A. The Statute Generally
The Washington medical malpractice statute of limitations was enacted
30. Bixler v. Bowman, 94 Wn. 2d 146, 152, 614 P.2d 1290, 1293 (1980) (Rosellini, J., dissent-
ing).
31. Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wn. 2d 894, 454 P.2d 406 (1969).
32. 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935).
33. Id. at 58-61,44 P.2d at 798-800.
34. 75 Wn. 2d 894, 454 P.2d 406 (1969).
35. Id. at 900-01,454 P.2d at 410.
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in 197136 and amended in 1976. 37 The current statute sets out three dis-
tinct limitation periods. First, the general rule is that medical malpractice
actions must be brought "within three years of the act or omission alleged
to have caused the injury or condition.' 38 Second, if after the three-year
period has elapsed the plaintiff "discovers or reasonably should have dis-
covered that the injury or condition was caused by the [defendant's] act or
omission," the plaintiff or her representative may bring an action within
one year of the date of discovery. 39 Third, no claim may be filed more
than eight years after the act or omission. 40 Only those under a legal disa-
bility41 may commence an action after these three statutory periods have
elapsed.42
B. Impact On the Discovety Rule
The Washington statute, as amended, restricts the judicially-created
36. Any civil action for damages against a hospital . . . or against the personnel of any hospi-
tal, or against a member of the healing arts including, but not limited to, a physician ....
chiropractor . . . . or a nurse . . . , based upon alleged professional negligence shall be
commenced within (1) three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act, or (2) one year from
the time that plaintiff discovers the injury or condition was caused by the wrongful act, which-
ever period of time expires last.
Act of March 23, 1971, ch. 80, § 1, 1971 Wash. Laws 194 (current version at WASH REV. CODE §
4.16.350(1981)).
37. Any civil action for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care which is provided
after June 25, 1976 against:
(1) A person licensed by this state to provide health care or related services . . .
(2) An employee or agent of a person described in subsection (I) of this section, acting in the
course and scope of his employment, . . . ;or
(3) An entity, . . . facility, or institution employing one or more persons described in sub-
section (1) of this section . . . ; based upon alleged professional negligence shall be com-
menced within three years of the act or omission alleged to have caused the injury or condition,
or one year of the time the patient or his tepresentative discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act or omission, whichever period
expires later, except that in no event shall an action be commenced more than eight years after
said act or omission. Any action not commenced in accordance with this section shall be barred:
Provided, That the limitations in this section shall not apply to persons under a legal disability as
defined in RCW 4.14.190.
Act of Feb. 21, 1976, ch. 56, § 1, 1975-76 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 214 (codified at WASH REV.
CODE § 4.16.350 (1981)).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.350 (3) (1981).
39. Id.
40. Id. This eight-year overall bar, added in 1976, applies only to health care administered after
June 25, 1976, the effective date of the 1976 amendment.
41. Washington law defines the following persons as legally disabled for purposes of the statutes
of limitations: (1) persons under eighteen years of age when the cause of action accrues; (2) persons
who are "incompetent or disabled to such a degree that he or she cannot understand the nature of the
proceedings . . . ;- and (3) persons "imprisoned on a criminal charge . . . for less than his or
her natural life." Id. § 4.16.190.
42. Id. § 4.16.350.
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discovery rule and the original statute in three ways. First, it reduces the
post-discovery period within which a plaintiff can bring an action from
three years to one year. Second, it adds the eight-year overall bar where
none existed before. Last, the current statute no longer includes the re-
quirement in the 1971 version that plaintiff be aware that defendant's con-
duct was wrongful before the one-year period commences. 43 Instead, the
one-year period begins to run once plaintiff discovers that defendant's act
or omission caused plaintiff's condition.44 Because plaintiffs often may
know that defendant's acts caused their injuries long before they learn
that such acts may have been tortious, the statutory period in many cases
will begin long before it would have under the statute as initially enacted.
Thus, the responsibility placed upon plaintiffs to promptly file their medi-
cal malpractice actions is significantly greater under the current statute
than it was under both the judicially created discovery rule and the 1971
version of the statute.
The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the discovery rule included
in the 1971 statute so as to provide much greater protection for plaintiffs
seeking relief for health care administered before the 1976 amendment
than is provided to those injured after that date. In Ohler v. Tacoma Gen-
eral Hospital,45 the court adopted the "legal injury" test in malpractice
cases involving the statutory discovery rule. The question in Ohler was
whether the one-year post-discovery period begins when the plaintiff
knows that defendant caused the injury, or whether it begins only when
plaintiff realizes that defendant's conduct might have been wrongful. The
court held that, under the 1971 version of the statute,46 the period does
not begin to run until plaintiff knows or should know47 of all essential
elements of the cause of action. 48 That is, plaintiff must be aware that
plaintiff suffered a legal injury rather than just a physical injury.
Plaintiff in Ohler knew from an early age that her blindness was caused
by excessive oxygen administered at defendant hospital immediately after
her birth. She alleged that she believed the oxygen was necessary because
43. The Washington Supreme Court so interpreted the 1971 statute in Ohler v. Tacoma Gen.
Hosp., 92 Wn. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979). See note 47 and accompanying text infra.
44. See generally note 19 and accompanying text supra (discussion of the Washington discovery
rule prior to 1971); note 37 supra (current statutory language).
45. 92 Wn. 2d 507,598 P.2d 1358 (1979).
46. The 1971 version applied because the relevant treatment was administered prior to June 25,
1976, the effective date of the 1976 amendment.
47. But see Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wn. App. 560, 610 P.2d 925 (1980). In Teeter, the court of
appeals held that the 1971 statute did not include the constructive knowledge requirement of the
common-law rule. That is, only actual knowledge of defendant's wrongful act, rather than knowl-
edge of facts from which plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the wrongful nature of such act,




of her premature birth. She first became aware at age twenty-one that the
oxygen may have been administered improperly. She filed her action six
months later. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that plaintiff had discovered defendant's wrongful
conduct as a young girl. Therefore, her cause of action accrued when she
reached eighteen, the age of majority, and was barred when she turned
nineteen. In reversing, the supreme court reasoned that one cannot dis-
cover a wrongful act until one realizes that a breach of duty has oc-
curred. 49 The court refused to hold plaintiff responsible for not having
recognized, at the young age when she first learned the cause of her blind-
ness, that the hospital's acts may have comprised a breach of legal duty. 50
In light of the new language of the 1976 amendment, 51 one can only
speculate whether the Ohler legal injury interpretation remains current.
Neither the supreme court nor the court of appeals has ruled on the mat-
ter. 52 The plain meaning of the statutory language indicates that Ohler
will not be followed in cases falling under the current discovery rule. The
1971 statute referred to plaintiff's discovery of defendant's "wrongful
act." 53 The word "wrongful" was construed by the court in Ohler to
mean a legal wrong. The current provision omits any reference to a
wrongful act. Instead, the one-year limitation applies when plaintiff dis-
covers "that the injury . . .was caused by [defendant's] act or omis-
sion. -54 Unless the court construes the phrase "act or omission" to mean
wrongful act or omission, 55 the Ohler rule cannot survive. The "legal
injury" test has been replaced by a "physical injury" test under which
the one-year discovery period now runs from the time that a patient dis-
covers that a physician's act or omission caused the patient's injury. It is
no longer relevant whether the patient knew the conduct was tortious.
In addition to foreclosing the legal injury test, the current statute pre-
cludes any action brought more than eight years after the act or omission
alleged to have caused plaintiff's injury. 56 The discovery rule thus is in-
applicable if a patient does not discover the fact of injury within eight
years of treatment.
This provision may prove especially burdensome to plaintiffs because
an action is barred even if an injury could not possibly have been discov-
ered within eight years. This is often the result in cases involving foreign
49. Id.
50. Id. at 510-11.
51. See generally note 37 supra (partial statutory text).
52. Indeed, neither court has had occasion to apply any aspect of the amended discovery rule.
53. See note 36 supra.
54. See note 37 supra.
55. There appears to be no authority in Washington to support this proposition.
56. See note 37 supra.
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substances which may remain hidden for many years after surgery, a fact
which has induced some states to exempt foreign substance cases from
their overall time limits. 57 Moreover, this provision also bars an action
against a physician who has knowingly and fraudulently concealed the
physician's negligence from the patient for eight years or more. 58 The
statutory language suggests that these results, intended or not, must be
tolerated absent action by the legislature.
The current medical malpractice statute of limitations has tipped the
discovery rule in favor of health-care providers. For actions arising under
the 1971 statute, the legal injury test set forth in Ohler reduces the impact
of the move from a three-year to a one-year period. But the statute after
1976 signals the demise of the Ohler rule in favor of a more conservative
physical injury test, and adds the eight-year overall limitation as well. In
view of these changes, health-care recipients must be increasingly vigi-
lant to preserve their rights when relying on the discovery rule.
C. Impact On the Continuing Course of Treatment Rule
The supreme court has stated that the 1971 statute significantly limited
57. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-14
(1979).
58. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment (also referred to as "equitable estoppel") has been
applied to medical malpractice cases in many jurisdictions. The doctrine provides essentially that a
physician who has intentionally concealed his negligence from his patient is barred from invoking the
statute of limitations on grounds of equitable estoppel. See Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270
P.2d 1, 8 (1954); Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d 891, 894-95 (1956); Lakeman v. La
France, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123,126 (1959); Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M. 143,530 P.2d 407,410
(1974); Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y. 2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 716 (1978); Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410
Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267,269 (1963).
The Washington Supreme Court declined to apply the fraudulent concealment doctrine to medical
malpractice cases in McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935). The court in McCoy
relied upon two earlier cases involving attorney malpractice, Smith v. Berkey, 134 Wash. 348, 235
P. 793 (1925), and Comell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 P. 602 (1914), for its holding. Plaintiff in
McCoy sought to have the court apply a statute which tolled the limitations period on an action for
fraud until the discovery by plaintiff of facts from which plaintiff could discover the fraud. The court
refused to so hold because the action was not one for fraud. 182 Wash. at 57-59, 44 P.2d at 799.
Washington courts have used the doctrine of equitable estoppel to defeat a statute of limitations
defense in other contexts. Equitable estoppel arises when defendant's acts or statements induce plain-
tiff reasonably to act or fail to act to plaintiff's detriment. Marsh v. General Adjustment Bureau, 22
Wn. App. 933, 935, 592 P.2d 676, 678 (1979); see also Murphy v. Huntington, 91 Wn. 2d 265, 588
P.2d 742 (1978) (stating that prior inconsistent statements of defendants are primary element of an
estoppel); Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wn. 2d 126, 443 P.2d 544 (1968) (estoppel
applies where defendant conceals facts or otherwise induces plaintiff not to bring suit).
Given the Washington courts' willingness to apply equitable estoppel in cases involving other
factual settings, the prudent counsel should recognize the possibility that the courts might extend the
doctrine in an appropriate medical malpractice case. See Matthies v. Knodel, 19 Wn. App. 1, 6, 573
P.2d 1332, 1336 (1977) (suggesting that equitable estoppel may foreclose a statute of limitations
defense in an attorney malpractice action).
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the continuing course of treatment rule, implying that the rule was all but
eliminated. 59 The courts have yet to consider the impact of the current
statute upon the rule. The supreme court's analysis of the 1971 statute.
however, appears unaffected by the current language. And despite the
court's statement, the continuing course of treatment rule, though lim-
ited, retains considerable vitality.
The Washington Supreme Court has had only one opportunity since the
1971 statute was enacted to consider its effect on the continuing course of
treatment rule. Bixler v. Bowma160 involved defendant's allegedly negli-
gent failure to detect. plaintiff's breast cancer. The question before the
court was whether the three-year statutory period began when plaintiff
last visited defendant, when she consulted another physician, or some
time in between when the first doctor-patient relationship was deemed
terminated. The court held that the period commenced when plaintiff last
consulted with defendant, stating that that was when the "alleged wrong-
ful act" took place. 61
Plaintiff in Bixler first notified defendant of the presence of a lump in
her breast in January of 1975.62 She followed his prescription of self-
examination and again consulted defendant in April of the same year.
Defendant once again recommended self-examination. Plaintiff consulted
another doctor in August of 1975, never seeing defendant again. The sec-
ond doctor diagnosed her cancerous condition and removed plaintiff's
breast three days later. 63 Plaintiff brought suit in June of 1978, more than
three years after last seeing defendant, but less than three years after first
visiting the second doctor. The trial court ruled that the action was barred
by the statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed, relying in part
on Samuelson v. Freeman,64 and holding that the date the physician-pa-
tient relationship terminated was a question of fact for the jury. 65 The
supreme court reinstated the decision of the trial court, finding that the
statute "substantially modified" the continuing course of treatment rule
by replacing that concept with one requiring a finding of the date of the
alleged wrongful act. The court decided, without further explanation, that
59. Bixlerv. Bowman. 94Wn. 2d 146, 150-51, 614 P.2d 1290, 1292(1980).
60. 94Wn. 2d 146, 614 P.2d 1290(1980).
61. Id. at 150, 614 P.2d at 1292. The court applied the 1971 version of the statute because
defendant's last allegedly negligent treatment of plaintiff was prior to June 25. 1976. the effective
date of the 1976 amendment.
62. Plaintiff had been defendant's patient since 1957. Id. at 147. 614 P.2d at 1290.
63. In addition, the cancer spread, necessitating a second radical mastectomy in 1977. Id. at 147,
614 P.2d at 1290-91.
64. 75 Wn. 2d 894, 454 P.2d 406 (1969), discussed in notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text
supra.
65. Bixler v. Bowman, 24 Wn. App. 815, 817. 604 P.2d 188. 189 (1979).
326
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the date of the wrongful act was plaintiff's last visit to defendant, barring
her claim. 66
Bixler gives rise to two major questions regarding the vitality of the
continuing course of treatment rule. First, because the Bixler court inter-
preted the 1971 statute, is the court's holding still applicable under the
current statutory language? Second, if the Bixler holding is still valid,
what remains of the continuing course of treatment rule?
Although the change of the statutory language from "wrongful act" to
"act or omission... caus[ing] the injury or condition" affected analysis
of the discovery rule, that change is without significance for the continu-
ing course of treatment rule. The label of "wrongful act" or "act or
omission" is irrevelant because the continuing course of treatment rule
concerns only when the alleged negligence occurred, not whether an act
is recognized as negligent. The Bixler court decided that the wrongful act
occurred the last time defendant saw plaintiff. It undoubtedly would have
reached the same result had it been called on to decide the date of the act
or omission which caused plaintiff's condition. Therefore, the Bixler
holding is unaffected by the language changes incorporated in the current
malpractice statute.
Assuming Bixler's continuing vitality, the question remains of the ex-
tent of its impact on the continuing course of treatment rule. The court in
Bixler noted that the statute "substantially modified" this rule.67 The ac-
tual result reached in the case indicates that the rule has not been signifi-
cantly restricted, however.
In Bixler, the three-year statute of limitations commenced when the
patient last visited the defendant doctor. This, according to the court, was
when the alleged wrongful act occurred, or, more precisely, when the last
alleged wrongful act occurred. Because the physician-patient relationship
reasonably may be viewed as terminating at that point, the Samuelson
rule is narrowed only insofar as it was possible under Samuelson to find
that this relationship continued until sometime after the last actual con-
66. 94 Wn. 2d at 150-51, 614 P.2d at 1292. Justice Rosellini wrote for the four dissenting
justices. He argued, essentially, that the defendant's alleged negligence consisted of ongoing acts of
omission. Citing Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wn. 2d 257, 130 P.2d 341 (1942), Justice Rosellini pointed
out the physician's duty to continue treatment until either medical care becomes unnecessary, he is
discharged, or he has informed his patient that he will no longer serve as treating physician. In Bixier,
therefore:
[E]very day that the defendant failed to contact the plaintiff and advise her to come in for tests
was a day of continuing acts of negligent omission. His duty continued until she manifested an
intent to rely on other medical help by seeking the advice of another doctor. Thus... the day of
the defendant's last wrongful act was August 3, 1975, a date within the period of limitation.
94 Wn. 2d at 153-54, 614 P.2d at 1293-94; see also 16 GONZ. L. REv. 825 (1981) (examination of
Bixler).
67. 94 Wn. 2d at 150-51,614 P.2d at 1290.
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tact. The facts in Samuelson did not require the court to decide this ques-
tion. 68 Indeed, prior to Bixler the Washington Supreme Court had never
had occasion to confront the issue. One can argue plausibly that the court
would have declined to so extend the statutory period 69 because of the
difficulty in deciding the precise point at which the relationship was sev-
ered. Had Samuelson been so construed and applied in the Bixler case,
the court would have reached the same result. Given that interpretation of
the Samnuelson rule, the limitation on the continuing course of treatment
rule announced in Bixier is insignificant.
The Washington courts have yet to decide under either the 1971 or cur-
rent versions of the statute a case involving negligent treatment (as op-
posed to negligent diagnosis as in Bixler) and continuing treatment by the
doctor thereafter. In applying the statute of limitations to such a case. two
alternative constructions are available under Bixler: (1) the statute runs
from the time of the initial negligent act; or (2) the statute runs from the
last time plaintiff consults defendant.
The latter is the better rule for several reasons. First, it is consistent
with the holding of Bixler. The court in Bixier held, in effect, that the
statute runs as of the last wrongful act. 70 There, the last wrongful act was
defendant's second failure to detect or make reasonable efforts to detect
plaintiff's cancer. In the case of a negligently performed operation. for
example, the trier of fact may well find that the doctor's failure to dis-
cover his earlier surgical negligence constitutes an ongoing negligent act
or omission. Under such circumstances, the last act or omission should be
deemed to take place when the patient last visits the doctor, just as in
Bixler.71
In addition, this rule places no potentially burdensome duty on a physi-
cian to monitor a patient who is no longer under the physician's care, a
result obtained if the doctor-patient relationship is held to continue until
some time after the patient's final visit. Last, the weight of authority in
other jurisdictions supports this view. 72
68. In Sanuelson, plaintiff last consulted defendant within three years of the filing of plantiff's
complaint. 75 Wn. 2d at 895, 454 P.2d at 407. The court, thus, was not called on to decide whether
the doctor-patient relationship could continue after the last contact.
69. The dissenters in Bixler argued in favor of interpreting both Samuelson and the 1971 statute
as allowing a finding that the doctor-patient relationship could in some cases continue after the last
contact. See note 66 supra. The court of appeals made a similar argument. Bixler v. Bowman. 24
Wn. App. 815,818-19, 604 P.2d 188, 190 (1979).
70. The court conceivably could have held that the statute runs as of thefirst wrongful act. Such a
holding would have totally obliterated the common-law continuing course of treatment rule.
71. If the trier of fact finds no ongoing negligence, the action would have to be barred under
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The holding in Bixler, then, does little to limit Washington's judicially-
created continuing course of treatment rule. In effect, it merely deter-
mines that the physician-patient relationship ends at the time of the 'last
visit by the patient. The Samuelson rule is limited only insofar as that rule
could have been extended to allow plaintiffs to argue successfully that the
statutory period begins sometime after the plaintiff's last contact with the
physician. Since the Washington courts never so extended Samuelson, the
continuing course of treatment rule appears to have survived virtually in-
tact.
III. CONCLUSION
The Washington medical malpractice statute of limitations, as currently
formulated, significantly restricts the judicially-created discovery rule.
This results from the statutory language precluding judicial application of
the legal injury test, creating an eight-year overall limitation period, and
reducing from three years to one year the post-discovery period allowed
plaintiffs. The continuing course of treatment rule, on the other hand, has
been affected only slightly. The supreme court's decision in Bixler v.
Bowman holds only that the doctor-patient relationship ends with the pa-
tient's last visit with the doctor. The crux of the rule, that the statute is
tolled during a continuing negligent course of treatment, endures.
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